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United States v. Boone
245 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2001)
LFas
On the morning of October 10, 1997,Jessie Pressley("Pressley") was killed
instantly when the pickup truck he was driving exploded. The explosion was
caused by a homemade pipe bomb that had been hidden under the body of the
truck In the months prior to his death, the decedent carried on an extramarital
affair with Sharon Boone, the wife of Gary Boone ("Boone"). After Sharon
Boone informed Boone that she was in love with Pressley and wanted a divorce,
he refused to end the relationship and threatened to kill her. Even after Sharon
Boone left the home and sought legal protection from her husband, Boone made
several subsequent threats against her life and Pressley's life. A state court judge
issued a restraining order to keep Boone from his wife and from Pressley.'
Boone was indicted on charges of possession of a firearm by a felon and
with bombing a vehicle used in interstate commerce.2 The counts were severed,
and on January 8, 1998, Boone was convicted of the firearms charge. In Febru-
ary 1998, prior to the start of the second trial, Boone wrote the district court a
letter which noted that the death penalty was a possible sentence for the second
count of the indictment and inquiring when additional counsel would be avail-
able. The district court did not respond to the request but noted on the record
that the issue was preserved. Boone proceeded through trial and sentencing with
one attorney. He subsequently was convicted and sentenced to life in prison.'
II. Hddig
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that it was
reversible error to denythe assistance of two counsel to a defendant charged in
a count in which the death penaltyis a possible sentence even when the govern-
ment does not seek the death penalty.4
1. United States v. Boone, 245 F3d 352, 355-56 (4th Cir. 2001).
2. Segav0y 18 U.S.C S 844() (Supp. V 1999) (providing that anyperson destro with
explosives a vehicle used in interstate commerce is subject to death penalty if death =suls to any
person from explosion); 18 U.S.C S 922( (1) (1994) (making it unlawful for anyperson convicted
of a crime punishable byiimprisonment for one year or more to carry any firearm or ammunition
in interstate commerce).
3. Bom 245 F.3d at 357-58.
4. Id
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The question on appeal to the Fourth Grcuit was whether a defendant, who
is charged with an offense for which the death penalty is a possible sentence, is
entitled by federal statute to the assistance of two attorneys even when the
govemnment has not sought the death penalty.' While this case applies only to
ederal courts, it has application in federal district courts in Virginia- Writing for
the majority, Judge Widener explained that the language of 18 U.S.C S 3005
created an absolute right to additional counsel, even when the government did
not opt to seek the death penalty. The majority found that the statutory lan-
guage, "[w]hoever is indicted for treason or other capital crime," automatically
entitled the defendant to additional counsel at the point in which he was indicted
under the statute.7
In opposing Boone's appeal, the Government pointed to the 1994 amend-
ment of the statute, which required that one of the additional counsel should be
"learned in the law applicable to capital cases."' The Government argued that
Congress's addition of the phrase "applicable to capital cases" demonstrated clear
legislative intent to limit the availability of additional counsel to defendants in
cases in which the government actively seeks the death penalty.9
The majority, however, was not persuaded by this reasoning. The court
held that the presence of the word iiz t in the statute reflected Congress's
clear intent to trigger the availability of additional counsel at the tire the defen-
dant is charged with a capital offense.'0 The majority explained that Congress
could have easily framed the statute to limit the availabilityof additional counsel
to instances in which the Government affirmatively seeks the death penalty."
Furthermore, the court pointed out that its reading of the statute was appropriate
in light of the federal death penaltyprocess because additional counsel could be
instrumental in preventing the defendant from even facing the death penalty.'2
Additional counsel "learned in the law applicable to capital cases" could serve an
important function in persuading the prosecution not to seek the death penalty
during the critical pre-trial period in which the Government decided whether to
seek the death penalty."
In dissent, Judge Kiser took issue with the majority's focus on the triggering
event and explained that the dispositive issue was the meaning of the term aptal
5. Id
6. Id at 358-59; seealso 18 US.C S 3005 (1994) (providing for the provision, on request of
the defendant, of two counsel to defendants in capital cases).
7. Bor 245 F.3d at 358-59; sw 5 3005.
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ai.14 Judge Kiser reasoned that a capital crime is not an offense for which
death is a possible sentence, but rather one for which the government actively
seeks a sentence of death.15 The dissent further argued that the majority's view
nBorw was inconsistent with the majorityof cicuits that had decided the issue. 6
In support, the dissent criticized Unita Staft v Watsc,1 7 the primary
authority for the majority opinion.'$ In Wan, the defendant was charged with
first degree murder under 18 U.S.C. S 111.' The trial court denied the defen-
dant's request for the appointment of two counseL0 On appeal, the Govern-
ment argued that because the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Fwmm v
Gwtia invalidated the death penalty, the defendant was not entitled to the
appoitment of multiple counsel.' The Fourth Qrcuit held that Ftmm ad-
dressed only the constitutional validity of the death penalty and did not address
the validity of the statutorily provided procedural protections associated with
"capital crimes."23
Judge Kiser opined that Wason lacked precedential or persuasive value
because of Congress's 1994 amendment to 18 U.S.C S 3005. Kiser explained
that the amendment showed clear congressional intent to base the right to
additional counsel on the intent of the prosecution to seek death rather than on
the penalies provided in the statute.25
Judge Kiser's dissent is important because the characterization of an offense
as capital gives rise to a number of procedural safeguards for the defendant. The
14. Id at 365.
15. Id
16. Id. seako United States v. Grimes, 142 F.3d 1342, 1347 (11th Or. 1998) (holding that
defendant is not entitled to benefts otherwise available in a capital case when the death penalty is
not a possible sentence); United States v. Steel, 759 F2d 706, 709-10 (9th Cr. 1985) (holding that
when death penalty is unavailable, defendant no loger entitled to witness lists or additional
counsel); United States v. Dufur, 648 F.2d 512,514-15(9th Cr. 1980) (holding that the purpose of
53005 derives from severity of punishment, therefore right to multiple counsel eliminated when
death penalyno longer available); United States v. Shepherd, 576 F.2d 719,727-28 (7th Cr. 1978)
(holding that defendant is no longer entitled to statutorily guaranteed procedural safeguards when
death sentence is no longer a possibility); United States v. Weddell, 567 F.2d 767, 770 (8th Cr.
1977) (holding that constitutional invalidation of death penaly strped an 18 US.C S 1111
indictment of its capital nature and eliminated rigt to ple counsel); 18 US.C§ 1111(1994).
17. 496 F.2d 1125 (4th COr. 1973).
18. Babo, 245 F.3d at 365; se United States v. Watson, 496 F.2d 1125 (4th Cr. 1973).
19. Wascn, 496 F.2d at 1125;sS 1111.
20. Waso, 496 F2d at 1125.
21. 408 US. 238 (1972).
22. Warso, 4% F.2d at 1126; seFurman v. Georgia, 408 US. 238,239-40 (1972) (holding
that the death penalty was constmutionaly invalid).
23. Id
24. Brwn, 245 F.3d at 366; saso 18 US.C S 3005 (1994) (providing for the provision, upon
the request of the defendant, of two counsel to defendants in capital cases).
25. BmA 245 F.3d at 366-67.
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number of peremptory juror strikes, production of prosecution witness lists, and
the number of court-appointed counsel available to a defendant all hinge on
whether the defendant is charged with a capital offense.26 Under the current
Fourth Circuit view, as expressed in Booe these safeguards are available to a
defendant at the moment he is indicted under a statute which provides for the
imposition of the death penalty."
Judge Kiser's view, however, is echoed by a number of other circuits,
presenting an issue that could be amenable to resolution in the United States
Supreme Court. In UnitiState 'v St*,28 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit held that the unavailability of the death penalty in a case
invalidates the defendant's right to the production of government witness lists
and additional counsel.2 In Unied States v WedL, 30 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the invalidation of the death penalty
stripped an indictment under 18 US.C 5 1111 of its capital nature and eliminated
the right to the appointment of multiple counsel3 In UnitedState v Shqeplni 32
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reached the same
result, holding that when the death penalty is no longer a possibility, the defen-
dant is no longer entitled to procedural safeguards that are statutorily guaranteed
to capital defendants."
While the Fourth Circuit adhered to its reasoning in Wasonin the wake of
the 1994 amendments to 18 U.S.C S 3005, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Cicuit held in UnitdStae v Gin that "a defendant is not
entitled to benefits he would otherwise receive in a capital case if the government
announces that it will not seek the death penaltyor the death penaltyis otherwise
unavailable by force of law."3M Gri.- is directly analogous to B ne. In Grim,
the defendant was charged under 18 U.S.C S 844() for placing a bomb on the
premises of his former place of employment, an apartment complex, intending
to cause propertydamage.36 When a resident of the complex unwittinglypicked
up a box containing the bomb, the bomb detonated and killed the resident
26. Sw S 3005 (providing for the appointment of two defense counsel in capital cases); 18
US.C S 3432 (1994) (providing capital defendant with indictment, list of jurors and istof prosecu-
tion witnesses at least three days prior to trial; FED. R. QUM. P. 24(b) (2001) (providing 20
peremptory challenges for defendant facing charge punishable by death).
27. B=Ang 245 F.3d at 364.
28. 759 F.2d 706 (9th Cr. 1985).
29. United States v. Steel, 759 F2d 706, 709- 10 (9th Or. 1985).
30. 567 FId 767 (8th Or. 1977).
31. United States v. Weddell, 567 F .d 767,770-71 (8th Cr. 1977); swaso 18 U.S.C S 1111
(1994).
32. 576 F.2d 719 (7th ar. 1977).
33. United States v. Shepherd, 576 F.2d 719, 727-28 (7th Or. 1977).
34. 142 F.3d 1342 (11th CAr. 1998).
35. United States v. Grimes, 142 F.3d 1342, 1347 (11th Or. 1998).
36. Id. at 1345.
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instantly." Prior to trial, the Government stipulated that it would not seek the
death penalty.38 The court held that the Government's stipulation effectively
transformed the proceeding into a non-capital one and extinguished any rights
of the defendant to additional procedural safeguards normally available to capital
defendants.39
In what could be characterized as a glaring inconsistency, the Grn 7 reason-
ing does not appear to apply when a defendant seeks the dismissal of an indict-
ment because of the federal statute of limitations. Because federal law applies a
five-year statute of limitations to all non-capital crimes, a defendant could argue
that if a crime is stripped of its capital nature that the statute of limitations should
apply.' The Eighth Circuit took up such an argument in UnitedStata v Enxry,"
in which the court held that the statute of limitations did not apply, even though
the death penalty was invalidated under Fumnr'2 The Enry court explicitly
found that the defendant was charged with a capital crime, even though the death
penalty was not available under Fwmm 4  Ernvy appears to overrule the central
holding of WaideJ, but the Eighth Circuit has not taken up the issue of multiple
counsel since Enrvy.
IV. (iion
In the wake of these decisions, in most circuits, the issue of whether a
defendant is entitled to the procedural safeguards afforded capital defendants will
turn on whether the Government has served notice on the defendant of its intent
to seek the death penalty." The rule announced in Boom, however, will require
federal district courts in the Fourth Circuit to provide additional counsel for
defendants at the moment theyare indicted for offenses where death is a possible
sentence. Current United States Department of Justice ("DOJ") procedures
require the United States Attomeyto receive written approval from the Attorney
37. Id
38. Id at 1347.
39. Id
40. Sraso 18 US.C S 3281 (1994) ("An indictment for anyoffense punishable bydeath may
be found at anytime without limitation."); 18 U.S.C § 3282 (1994) ("Except as otherwise expressly
provided by law, no person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any offense, not capital,
unless the indictment is found or the information is instituted within five years next after such
offense shall have been committed.").
41. 186 F.3d 921 (8th (ar. 1999).
42. United States v. Emery, 186 F3d 921, 924 (8th (ar. 1999).
43. Id
44. Se, eg, United States v. Edelin, 128 F. Supp. 2d 23,32 (D.D.C 2001) (finding that death-
eligible co-defendants not facing death penalty, but tried alongside a capital defendant, are not
entitled to production of government witness lists); United States v. Davidson, No. 92-CR-35,1992
WL 165825, at *4 (ND.N.Y July 10, 1992) (holding that defendant not facing possible death




General prior to seeking the death penalty in any case.45 DOJ policy further
requires that the United States Attorney grant the defendant the opportunity to
present any facts, including mitigation evidence, during the Government's
consideration of whether to seek the death penalty4 6 Finally, the Government's
request for authorization to seek the death penalty must be reviewed by a DOJ
committee convened by the Attorney General for the purpose of reaching a
determination as to whether to seek death.47 Defense counsel is entitled to
appear before this committee to show cause as to why the Government should
not seek death. 8 The additional counsel can then assist the defendant in per-
suading the Government to take the death penalty off the table early on.
Damien P. DeLaney
45. United States Department of Justice, US. A £rmcsys Mamd S 9-10.020 (June 7, 2001),
auiae hir .tp/www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_rading room/usam/tile9/ 10mcrnhtm (last
visited Oct. 10, 2001).
46. Id at S 9-10.030.
47. Id at S 9-10.050.
48. Id
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